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INTRODUCTION

"A dramatic globalization trend ... is presently transforming the
nature of securities markets and the nature of transactions conducted in
those markets. Propelled by advancing technology, global linkages are
increasingly being forged and significant transnational movements of
capital have become the norm rather than the exception." 1 Arguably, at
the center of market globalization lies the United States, as it maintains
the world's largest, most efficient, and most secure securities markets.
There exists, however, an over protective parent of U.S. securities
markets, the U.S. Congress. Congress, through legislation enforced by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), governs the
U.S.'s global securities markets. For example, Congress' SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 ("SOx") sets new requirements and standards for
public companies traded on U.S. securities markets. SOx creates
considerable national and international controversy, however, because it
exercises significant, contentious, and harmful control over foreign
companies, who trade publicly on U.S. securities markets. All together,
SOx is a detriment.
This Note illustrates, in light of current market globalization, how
(1) SOx is a detriment to market globalization, and (2) how the
International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") is
better suited than the SEC to govern and regulate international securities
trading. First, this paper defines and examines market globalization, as
well as U.S. and non-U.S. involvement (i.e., foreign involvement) in
market globalization. Second, it addresses the means by which
Congress regulates U.S. securities markets, specifically focusing on
SOx and its affect on foreign companies traded on U.S. securities
exchanges. Finally, this paper considers which regulatory body, the
SEC or the IOSCO, would best serve the international securities market,
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and thus market globalization, through commitment, independence, and
repute.
I.

MARKET GLOBALIZATION

To understand SOx's affect on market globalization, one must first
establish a working definition and understanding of "market
globalization" and why it is so significant.

A.

Internationalization

From an economic standpoint, little else is as impressive as the
current state of market globalization. 2
But, what is "market
globalization?" In general, globalization means "to extend to other or
all parts of the globe; make worldwide." 3 There are, however, various
forms of and perspectives on globalization. 4 For example, some
examine globalization in terms of activity amongst governments. 5
Others examine it as a spreading of modem social structures, at the
expense of pre-existing cultures. 6 This Note, however, focuses on
globalization in terms of capital markets, or more broadly,
"internationalization," as defined by Jan Aart Scholte, Professor in
Politics and International Studies, and Acting Director of the Center for
the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at The University of
Warwick, England: 7
Globalization as internationalization ... is viewed 'as simply another

2. ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED: EVERYTHING You
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT How THE ECONOMY WORKS AND WHERE IT'S GOING 195 (1998).
3. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 812 (2d ed. 2001).
4. Infed,
Definitions
of
Globalization,
at
http://www.infed.org/biblio/defining_globalization.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005)
[hereinafter Definitions of Globalization].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The University of Warwick: Politics and International studies, at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/staff/scholte (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). Mr.
Scholte's credentials on globalization are extensive: Co-Editor of Global Governance;
Member of the Steering Committee of the Globalization Studies Network; Vice-President
for Politics and International Studies of the Global Studies Association; Member of
Advisory Boards for the Global Accountability Project, One World Trust, United Nations
University Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Global Institutional Design Project,
and Globalization and Autonomy Project; Member of the Editorial Boards for Global Social
Policy, Globalizations, Journal of Civil Society, Journal of International Relations and
Development; past Chair of International Organization Section of the International Studies
Association; and past visiting fellow at Cornell University, the London School of
Economics, and the International Monetary Fund. Id.
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adjective to describe cross-border relations between countries.' It
describes the growth in international exchange and interdependence.
With growing flows of trade and capital investment there is the
possibility of moving beyond an inter-national economy, (where 'the
principle entities are national economies') to a 'stronger' version-the
globalized economy in which, 'distinct national economies are
subsumed and rearticulated into the system by international processes
and transactions.' 8

This definition of globalization is most applicable, here, for two
reasons. First, like this Note, it addresses globalization from a market
perspective, as opposed to one of the other aforementioned
perspectives. 9 Second, it encompasses both the expanding international
trade markets of goods and "capital investment," as well as the theory
that globalization shifts a country's point of view from "intrastate" to
"interstate." 10 The importance of the second prong will become more
apparent when this Note addresses who is in the best position to
regulate international securities trading, the SEC or the ISOCO.

B.

Globalization 's Permanent Mark

Globalization is not just a theory; it is a real and permanent
phenomenon, which draws the attention of global organizations. For
example, the rise of globalization is so steep that it was a focus of the
2004 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("U.N.
Conference"). 11 More specifically, the U.N. Conference measured and
evaluated the impact of globalization on the global economy. 12 The
U .N. Conference examined the value of "international trade in
merchandise and services" as one technique to measure and evaluate the
impact of globalization. 13 The dollar values that the U.N. Conference
reported are staggering:

8. Definitions of Globalization, supra note 4. In addition to Mr. Scholte's definition of
globalization as "internationalization," he also defines globalization in terms of
"liberalization,"
"universalization,"
"westernization
or
modernization,"
and
"deterritorialization," which this Note will not address due to their social, rather than
economic, focus. Id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 2004, Development and
Globalization: Facts and Figures, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/CSIR/2004/1 (2004),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdscsir20041_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2006)
[hereinafter U.N. Conference].
12. See id.
13. Id. at 48.
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In 2002, the value of total merchandise exports from all countries of
the world was $6,414 billion (in current U.S. dollars). Two-thirds of
these exports were from developed countries. 14 The value of total
exports of services was $1,611 billion (in current U.S. dollars), and
almost three-fourths of these were from developed countries. 15

Viewed as a percentage, the increase in "the share of world merchandise
exports in the world gross domestic product" is just as impressive. 16
From 1960 to 2000, the percentage doubled from ten percent to twenty
percent. 17 Similarly, the "share of services in world output" increased
from three percent in 1960 to five percent in 2000. 18
The U.N. Conference also calculated Foreign Direct Investment
("FDI") stock as a second technique to measure and evaluate
globalization. 19 The U.N. Conference defines FDI stock as:
[T]he value of the share of the capital and reserves, including retained
profits, attributable in an affiliate enterprise to the parent enterprise,
plus the net indebtedness of the affiliate to the parent enterprise. For
branches, it is the value of fixed assets and current assets and
investment, excluding amounts due from the parent, less liabilities to
third parties. 20

Over the past twenty years, world inward FDI stock-"stock [that]
reflects the position at the end of a reporting period of a country's
external financial liabilities, owned by direct investors either directly or
through other related enterprises, in foreign affiliates"-grew
exponentially. 21 By 2002, it reached a staggering $7.1 trillion. 22
Surprisingly, the recent economic recession, which the U.S.
endured from March 2001 through November 2001, did not stifle FDI. 23

14. "Developing countries' merchandise exports grew, on average, 12% a year in the
period 1960-2002." Id.
15. Id. "Exports of services grew 9% a year in developing countries and 8% in
developed countries during 1980-2002." Id.
16. U.N. Conference, supra note 11, at48.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id.
21. U.N. Conference, supra note 11, at 34.
22. Id.
23. Associated Press, It's Official: 2001 Recession Only Lasted Eight Months, USA
TODAY, July 17, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2003-07-17-
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Rather, FDI stock continued to increase, although not as quickly as
previously observed. 24 More specifically, by 2002 outward FDI stockstock that "reflects the position at the end of a reporting period of a
country's external financial assets, owned by direct investors either
directly or through other related enterprises, in affiliates abroad"originating from emerging countries made up twelve percent of the
global FDI stock. 25 The European Union provided the largest amount of
outward FDI stock at $3.4 trillion in 2002, surpassing the U.S.'s amount
by more than double. 26
On a macro-level, globalization is here to stay, for better or for
worse. "In a shrinking world featuring a ·growing number of emerging
market economies, this trend is not likely to abate."27 Under SOx,
however, the U.S.'s central role in globalization, specifically
international securities trading, will likely subside.
C.

U.S. Involvement in Globalization

On a more micro-level, globalization makes a substantial mark in
the U.S. For example, despite the recent recession, which began in the
U.S. in early 2001, labor force productivity, which one calculates by
summing the "growth in the labor force and output per work hour,"
improved at an average rate of five percent. 28 This improvement, which
baffles many economists, is a direct result of global competition
between producers of goods and services because even though the U.S.
was in the midst of a recession, global supply and demand continued. 29
The astounding increase of U.S. labor force productivity vividly
demonstrates the affect of globalization on, and in, the U.S. 30 Simply
put, the U.S. and its companies today "are competing in a world
market," a global market. 31
The U.S. is central to globalization in two respects: (1) its rate of

recession_x.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter 2001 Recession]; U.N. Conference,
supra note 11, at 34.
24. U.N. Conference, supra note 11, at 34.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Testy, supra note 1, at 928.
28. 2001 Recession, supra note 23; William J. McDonough, Speech at the Fourth
Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law (2004), in 9
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583, 588-89 (2004) [hereinafter McDonough].
29. See McDonough, supra note 28, at 588-89.
30. Id. at 589.
31. Id. at 590.
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consumption, and (2) its securities exchanges or markets. 32 First, U.S.
participation in economic globalization, through its rate of consumption,
is substantial. Just a few years ago, the combination of U.S. imports
and exports surpassed twenty-five percent of the U.S.'s Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP"), which "measures the value of all goods and services
produced within the [U.S.], regardless of whether the producer is a U.S.
firm or a foreign one located here [in the U.S.], or whether it is an
American worker or a national resident here [in the U.S.]." 33 Just as
there are markets for domestic goods and services, like lumber and
lawyering, a market for money developed in excess of one trillion
dollars, for the sole purpose of exerting foreign exchange purchasing
power. 34 As a result, the names and products of foreign companies,
such as Sony, Honda, and Nokia, are commonplace in American
households.
Second, the U.S. is home to arguably the world's most prestigious
and influential securities markets, such as the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"). 35 There are approximately fifteen exchanges in
the U.S., including the options, commodity, and mercantile exchanges. 36
Of all the U.S. exchanges, though, the NYSE sets the world's bar for
securities exchanges:
The NYSE is the world's leading and most technologically advanced
equities market. ... On an average day, 1.46 billion shares, valued at
$46.1 billion, trade on the NYSE. In 2004, the NYSE was again the

32. "Securities" are investment instruments, which generally come in two types, debt
and equity. See ROBERT w. HAMILTON, MONEY MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS AND CLIENTS:
ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 300 (1993). Debt securities are, basically, "loan
interests" between a company and an investor, where the company borrows money from the
investor under an agreement that the company will pay the loan back with interest. See id.
Equity securities are, on the other hand, "ownership interest" where a corporation sells an
interest in its ownership to an investor. See id. "Exchanges" are markets where investors are
able to trade both their debt and equity securities. See id. at 322.
33. HEILBRONER& THUROW,supra note 2, at 195.
34. Id. at 195-96.
35. See generally HAMILTON supra note 32, at 299-356 (1993) (discussing securities
markets as places where, or means by which, equity and debt securities, such as stock and
bonds respectively, are traded between buyers and sellers).
36. CPAnet.com,
U.S.
Exchanges,
at
http://www.cpanet.com/finance/sitesonly .asp?LIST=0208&Lists=U. S. %20Exchanges (last
visited Dec. 30, 2005). U.S. securities exchanges include the AMEX, Arizona Stock
Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, Kansas City Board of Trade, MidAmerica Commodity
Exchange, NASDAQ, New York Cotton Exchange, New York Mercantile Exchange,
NYSE, Pacific Stock Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. Id.
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most competitive venue for trading its listed stocks, providing
investors with the lowest costs, deepest liquidity and best prices. 37

Not only is the NYSE "the world's leading and most
technologically advanced equities market," it is "the largest equities
marketplace in the world, [and] is home to about 3,000 companies
worth more than $17 trillion in global market capitalization."38 The
NYSE, alone, would likely place the U.S. at the center of the
globalization map. Yet, thanks to SOx, the interest of foreign issuers in
U.S. capital markets, such as the NYSE, will likely deteriorate.

D.

Foreign Companies' Access to U.S. Capital Markets

The ability to access U.S. markets is not reserved solely for U.S.
companies. Foreign companies are also able to access these markets,
although the means and extent of access varies. 39 The reach of a foreign
company's hand into U.S. securities markets, specifically, may be
limited, depending on the means in which a foreign company wishes to
access these markets.
There are three, primary ways in which a foreign company may
access markets in the U.S.: (1) private placements, (2) over-the-counter
offerings, or (3) fully registered public offerings. 40

1.

Private Placements

Private placements are where foreign companies sell their
"Institutional
securities directly to large institutional investors.
investors are large investors who primarily invest other people's money.
They include insurance companies, pension funds, investment
companies . . . bank trust departments, charitable foundations,
educational institutions, and similar organizations."41 One reason these
placements are termed "private" is because the institutional investors
cannot freely trade the securities on secondary exchanges, like the

37. New
York
Stock
Exchange,
About
the
NYSE,
http://www.nyse.com/about/1088808971270.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
38. MarketVolume.com, What is the New York Stock Exchange Indicator?,
http://www.marketvolume.com/content/products/indicators/details/nyse.asp (last visited
Dec. 30, 2005). "Market capitalization" is "the price per share times the number of shares
outstanding." DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 407 (2002).
39. Hannah Buxbaum et al., Regulating Corporations: Who's Making the Rules?, in 97
AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 269 (2003) [hereinafter Regulating Corporations].
40. Id. at 269-70.
41. HAMILTON, supra note 32, at 530.
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NYSE. 42 Dealing in such a restricted trading market can be a drawback
for foreign companies who are looking to tap the deep pockets of U.S.
securities exchanges. 43 One reason, however, foreign companies
partake in private placements is because the companies do "not have to
comply with [the SEC's full] disclosure requirements, although there
must be some compliance with [the SEC's] procedural requirements
relating to private offerings. ''44 In other words, the SEC' s regulation of
private placements by foreign companies is minimal. 45

2.

Over-the-Counter Offerings

The over-the-counter ("OTC") market is a market amongst
brokers, dealers, and market makers. 46 "A 'dealer' is a securities firm
trading for its own account while a 'broker' is executing an order for a
customer."47 The biggest player in an OTC market, however, is the
"market maker."48 "A 'market maker' is a dealer who announces its
continued willingness to both buy and sell a specific security."49 The
OTC market is not a very liquid or transparent market. 50 Also, unlike
the NYSE, whose building is "located in the central part of the financial
district on Wall Street in New York City," the OTC market does not
exist in a set geographic location. 51 Instead, brokers, dealers, and
market makers buy and sell securities via computer or telephone. 52
Foreign companies who enter the OTC market, like those who
make private placements, undergo "minimal contact with the SEC, and
these companies do not have to comply with SEC disclosure
requirements." 53 In return, however, the ability of such foreign
companies to reach the full benefits of U.S. securities markets is
limited-like foreign companies who make private placementsbecause they cannot make a public offering, as discussed later, and be
freely traded on a liquid, secondary market, like the NYSE. 54

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 269-70.
See id.
See id. at 269.
Id.
HAMILTON, supra note 32, at 336-37.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 269.
HAMILTON, supra note 32, at 336.
Id.
Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 269.
Id.
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Fully Registered Public Offerings

In order for a foreign company to access the complete financial
depth and liquidity of U.S. securities exchanges, such as the NYSE, the
foreign company may make a full registration with the SEC. 55 A full
registration with the SEC requires foreign companies to make a number
of disclosures:
The registration forms companies file provide essential facts while
minimizing the burden and expense of complying with the law. In
general, registration forms call for: [1] a description of the company's
properties and business; [2] a description of the security to be offered
for sale; [3] information about the management of the company; and
[4] financial statements certified by independent accountants.
Registration statements and prospectuses become public shortly after
filing with the SEC. 56

A U.S. company who wants to access U.S. securities markets
would undergo a very similar registration process. 57 Once the SEC
deems the foreign company's registration "effective," (i.e., approves it)
the company becomes a legitimate foreign issuer. 58 At such a time, the
company may finalize its initial public offering ("IPO"), and its stock
may "hit" the market, where it will be freely traded on a U.S. securities
exchange, like the NYSE. 59

E.

Active Foreign Issuers in U.S. Capital Markets

The willingness of foreign companies to complete full registrations
with the SEC and access U.S. securities markets changed over the
years. 60 "In the early 1980s, relatively few foreign firms chose to list in
the United States. This changed dramatically as many foreign firms
listed in the mid-1990s," 61 when the SEC altered its attitude toward
55. Id. at 270.
56. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws That Govern the Securities
Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
57. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 270.
58. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 409 (2002); see also
Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 270.
59. See EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 409; see also Regulating Corporations, supra note
39, at 270.
60. See Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 271.
61. Christopher Woo, The Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Foreign Private Issuers
1, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/christopher_woo.pdf (last visited Dec.
30, 2005) [hereinafter Woo].
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foreign issuers, as discussed later. Today, hundreds of foreign
companies trade on U.S. exchanges. The number of foreign issuers rose
from 173 in 1981 to over 1,300 today. 62 This phenomenon (or strategy)
often occurs in the form of "cross-listing"-where a company lists on
both its domestic securities exchange and a U.S. securities exchange. 63
The origins of foreign issuers span the globe to include North
America, Latin America, Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. 64
There are many reasons why foreign companies are attracted to U.S.
securities markets. 65 First, U.S. investor demand for foreign securities
is abundant in U.S. markets. 66 This means that "the U.S. capital
markets are deep and liquid," and "foreign firms can raise funds at
lower costs than at home."67 Second, "[s]tudies have found that crosslisting in the [U.S.] leads to increased ... visibility" (i.e., the ability for
investors to monitor and understand the financial statements and
corporate structures, which the company must disclose). 68 Third,
"listing on an exchange with [a] stricter disclosure environment than the
home country exchange conveys a management's confidence in its
future earnings."69 Fourth, foreign issuers are able to piggyback the
high level of protection that U.S. investors enjoy, when they cross-list
on U.S. markets. 7 Finally, cross-listing on a well-known exchange,
such as the NYSE, provides "exposure and prestige" for the foreign
issuer. 71
The benefits of cross-listing on a U.S. exchange are valued
differently by different companies in different parts of the world. For
example, the Israeli Parliament permits Israeli companies who are
issuers on a U.S. exchange "to list their stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange based on voluntary disclosures or disclosures they make
under U.S. law." 72 Better pricing and prestige are the reasons European
companies issue on a U.S. exchange. 73 For Japanese issuers, prestige is

°

62. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 271.
63. See Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?,
71 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 206 (revised Sept. 27, 2001).
64. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 271.
65. Id.; see also Woo, supra note 61, at 3-7.
66. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 271.
67. Doidge, supra note 63, at 208.
68. See Woo, supra note 61, at 4.
69. Woo, supra note 61, at 5.
70. Doidge, supra note 63, at 209.
71. Id. at 206.
72. Woo, supra note 61, at 6.
73. Id.
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almost the sole reason. 74
Altogether, foreign issuers make a large financial impact on, and
in, U.S. securities markets. For example, the thirty-one German
companies listed on U.S. exchanges have approximately "$287 billion
in market capitalization." 75 Even more impressive are the thirty
Japanese companies, which have approximately "$420 billion in market
capitalization."76
The financial impact of these and other foreign issuers is not only
beneficial for U.S. markets and foreign companies, but benefits extend
back to the many regions of the world from where the foreign
companies originate. 77
A study of the "[a]ggregate market
capitalization for foreign stocks listed on ... [the] NYSE over market
capitalization of home country stock exchange for different regions"
demonstrates that "[t]he overall U.S. market is important for Israel and
Latin America." 78 The study also shows that U.S. markets were not as
important for Europe and East Asia, initially, but their importance
increased steadily since 1997. 79
SOx, however, diminishes the current extent and future prospects
of these benefits, as it alters the SEC' s treatment of foreign issuers and
their ability to enter U.S. markets.
II.

THE SEC's TREATMENT OF FOREIGN ISSUERS

The SEC's regulation of foreign issuers changed over time.
Starting with the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934 through Congress' most recent securities legislation regulation,
SOx, 80 the SEC has implemented three approaches, generally, in its
treatment of foreign issuers: Isolationist, Internationalist, and
Unilateralist. 81

A.

The Isolationist Approach

The SEC adopted an "isolationist" approach between 1933 and the
74. Id.
75 . Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 27 B .C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 501 , 512 (2004).
76. Id. at513.
77. Woo, supra note 61, at 36-61.
78. Id. at 55.
79. Id.
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002].
81. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes
Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 853-56 (2004).
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late 1970s or early 1980s. 82 The isolationist approach segregated U.S.
issuers from foreign issuers and significantly restricted foreign issuers'
access to U.S. securities markets.83 For example:
This [isolationist] attitude was manifested in such policy initiatives as
the Canadian and then the foreign restricted list to keep out
unregistered foreign companies. The SEC also made very aggressive
claims of extraterritorial application, and a whole series of cases was
[sic] brought under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 84

In other words, the SEC was building a great wall around U.S. securities
markets, through various initiatives, to keep foreign companies out of
U.S. markets. As a matter of fact, some say that Congress, when it
enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts, did not even consider foreign issuers. 85
This, however, is not entirely true because "special registration forms
for foreign sovereign debt" were included in the 1933 Act, and
Congress defined interstate commerce to include "commerce between
states and foreign jurisdictions. " 86 Although foreign companies were
able to access U.S. securities exchanges, there were significant
restrictions-restrictions that resurface with the enactment of SOx.
B.

The Internationalist Approach

Beginning in the early 1980s, the SEC migrated from the selfcentered attitude of the isolationist approach to an "internationalist"
approach, which embraced foreign issuers. 87 The SEC's change in
attitude is attributable to a number of catalysts. First, a global capital
market emerged in London as a European securities market began to
blossom. 88 The U.S. government did not consider this development a
positive occurrence, as it deflated the importance of U.S. capital
markets. 89 Second, better cooperation developed between the SEC and
foreign regulators, with the creation of the IOSCO, "a truly international

82. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 272 (quoting Roberta Karmel).
83. See id. at 272-73; see also Karmel, supra note 81, at 853-56; Shirley, supra note
75,at516.
84. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 273.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 273.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/21

12

McLean: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Detriment To Market Globalization & Int

2005]

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Detrimental Act

331

regulatory body. " 90 Third, the SEC recognized that the listing of
foreign companies on U.S. exchanges provided numerous benefits. 91
For example, U.S. investors benefit through the increase in investment
opportunity, while foreign issuers benefit through the increase in
liquidity, capital, and diverse investors, which U.S. markets provide. 92
Capital markets, in general, benefit through the increased integration of
the global economy. 93
During the internationalist era, the SEC provided a number of
accommodations to foreign investors in order to entice them to register
with the SEC and cross list on U.S. exchanges. For example, foreign
issuers were exempt from "proxy solicitation regulations," to which
U.S. companies are subjected. 94 In addition, the SEC allotted more time
to foreign issuers to file their annual reports. 95 Moreover, the SEC did
not require foreign issuers to disclose executive compensation, although
there is a global trend to disclose executive compensation today because
of its relevance when analyzing potential investments. 96 The SEC also
permitted more flexible accounting standards for foreign issuers. 97 In
particular, the SEC permitted foreign issuers to use International
Accounting Standards ("IAS"), rather than the U.S.'s Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). 98
The most important aspect of the SEC's new relaxed stance toward
foreign issuers was, arguably, that "the SEC did not attempt to regulate
the corporate governance of foreign corporations," who, in order to
increase their marketability on U.S. securities exchanges, fully
registered with the SEC. 99 This leniency was not extended to fully
registered U.S. companies. Rather, the SEC attempted to regulate the
corporate governance of public U.S. companies as far as the law would
permit it, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
eventually addressed in Business Roundtable v. SEC. 100
Business Roundtable reigned in the SEC's ability to regulate the
corporate governance of domestic, and consequently foreign,

90. Id.
91. Id. at 270.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Karmel, supra note 81, at 858; see also Buxbaum, supra note 39, at 271.
95. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 271.
96. Id.
97. Karmel, supra note 81, at 860.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 850.
100. Id. at 849, 852; Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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companies. 101 The court held that Congress, in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, did not empower the SEC with unhindered authority to
regulate corporate governance. 102 Congress, however, would later
provide the SEC with the authority to regulate corporate governance,
with the passage of SOx. 103
C.

The Unilateralist Approach

Today, with the enactment of SOx, the SEC utilizes a
"unilateralist" approach in its treatment of foreign issuers, in that very
few re~istration and disclosure exemptions are granted to foreign
issuers. 04 Instead, the SEC presents foreign issuers with an all or
nothing deal-either comply with SOx and the enumerated
requirements or look to other securities markets. 105
SOx employs unilateralism on its face, as the "statutory provisions
make no real exceptions for foreign issuers." 106 In addition, its
provisions are retroactive because they apply to the foreign issuers
already fully registered with the SEC and trading their securities on U.S.
exchanges. 107 Furthermore, the timeframe in which Congress required
the SEC to create rules for the implementation of SOx was "intolerably
short." 108 Consequently, the SEC did not have sufficient time to create
rules to appropriately accommodate foreign issuers. 109 In all, the
enactment and implementation of SOx is a return to the isolationist
approach, as discussed earlier.

101. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F .2d 406.
In 1984 General Motors announced a plan to issue a second class of common stock
with one-half vote per share. The proposal collided with a longstanding rule of the
[NYSE] that required listed companies to provide one vote per share of common
stock. The NYSE balked at enforcement, and after two years filed a proposal with
the [SEC] to relax its own rule. The SEC did not approve the rule change but
responded with one of its own. On July 7, 1988, it adopted Rule l 9c-4, barring
national securities exchanges and national securities associations, together known as
self-regulatory organizations (SROs), from listing stock of a corporation that takes
any corporate action 'with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing
the per share voting rights of [existing common stockholders].'
Id. at 406.
102. Id.
103. Karmel, supra note 81, at 852.
104. Id. at 856.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Karmel, supra note 81, at 856.
109. See id.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/21

14

McLean: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Detriment To Market Globalization & Int

2005]

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Detrimental Act

333

III. THE SARBANES-0XLEY ACT

SOx's purpose is not to restrict foreign issuers' access to U.S.
securities exchanges. Rather, it was a reaction to the demise of a
number of domestic, not foreign, corporations.
A.

The Reasons for SOx

A direct correlation exists between SOx and the 2001 economic
recession. 110 Although there are a number of catalysts that prompted the
recession, one is most responsible for the enactment of Sox-U.S.
corporate corruption, which resulted in the largest U.S. corporate
bankruptcies ever recorded. 111
The bankruptcy of Enron Corporation ("Enron"), in December
2001, began a hemorrhage of historic bankruptcies, pregnant with
accounting, investment, and management fraud. 112 Alone, Enron
recorded over $40 billion in debt, liabilities, and operating losses
because of misappropriated funds, undisclosed fees, and general
corporate fraud. 11 Global Crossing, Inc. quickly followed Enron and
recorded "liabilities of $12.4 billion" in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing, brought on by deceptive derivative investments. 114 In the spring
of 2002, Adelphia, Inc., disclosed $2.3 billion in misappropriated
funds.1 15 These three, however, pale in comparison to WorldCom's $41
billion bankruptcy filing, a result of deliberate misclassification of
assets and liabilities. 116
B.

The Goals and Means of SOx

SOx, as a result of the aforementioned corporate scandals that
currently plague the U.S., is a Congressional attempt "[t]o protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other
purposes." 117 In brief, Title I of SOx creates the Public Company
110. See 2001 Recession, supra note 23; see also Regulating Corporations, supra note
39, at 271; Shirley, supra note 75, at 501.
111. Regulating Corporations, supra note 39, at 271; see also Shirley, supra note 75, at
501.
112. Shirley, supra note 75, at 501-04. For an in-depth discussion of Enron, see
generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport &
Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
113. Shirley, supra note 75, at 502-03.
114. Id. at 503.
115. Id. at 504.
116. Id. at 504-05.
117. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 80.
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Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") to regulate the public
accountants who audit issuers traded on U.S. exchanges; Title II
addresses auditor independence and places a five year rotation
requirement on auditing partners; Title III, a contentious section for
foreign issuers, deals with corporate responsibility; Title IV enhances
financial disclosures for issuers; Title V is aimed at conflicts of interest
created by the analysts for public issuers; Title VI increases SEC
resources and authority; Title VII requires that studies and reports of the
industry be conducted; Title VIII sets a higher standard of accountably
for corporate and criminal fraud; Title IX enhances penalties for white
collar crimes; Title X requires CEOs to, literally, signoff on their
company's federal income tax return; and Title IX, again, addresses
accountability for corporate fraud. 118 Together, the sections of SOx
increase financial and corporate governance disclosure requirements,
while increasing the penalties for lack of disclosure and fraud, for both
domestic and foreign publicly traded companies. 119
C.

The Benefits of SOx

Issuers derive a number of benefits from SOx. For example, Title
IV of SOx increases financial disclosure standards for issuers. 120
Although a likely hindrance upon first impression, the increase benefits
issuers because most investors believe companies that meet higher
disclosure standards have greater value; thus, investors are more likely
to invest in the issuer. 121 Similarly, Title IX increases punishment for
white-collar crime. 122 Investors, in return, feel that their investment is
more secure because company directors have more to lose when
engaging in fraudulent activity. 123 Altogether, SOx increases investor
protection-a reason with which foreign companies look to enter the
U.S. markets to start, as discussed previously. 124
Nevertheless, the burdens SOx creates drastically overshadow its
benefits, a result of legislative haste. 125

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. §§ 101-1106.
See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 80.
See id. at§§ 401-09.
See Doidge, supra note 63, at 208-09.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 80, at§§ 901-1001.
See Doidge, supra note 63, at 208-09.
See id. at 209.
See Shirley, supra note 75, at 501; see also Karmel, supra note 81, at 862.
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SOx: Legislative Haste

There is a general sentiment that Congress enacted SOx in haste. 126
A number of aspects illustrate this idea. First, "[t]he speed with which
[SOx] became law was startling." 127 It took Congress only seven
months to pass SOx after Enron' s bankruptcy filin~ in December
2001. 128 Typically, Congress "acts slowly at best." 12 Second, it is
apparent that "[t]he criminal provisions of [SOx] were drafted with
extraordinary haste, a haste that produced inartful and sometimes vague
or duplicative provisions." 130 Third, the actual financial cost in
complying with SOx is extraordinary, as discussed later, which
demonstrates that Congress enacted SOx quickly, giving its ultimate
effects little, if any consideration. 131 Most importantly, the three bills
that form SOx were merely "cut-and-pasted" together:
Due to the haste with which the final Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was
assembled, Congress made no serious attempt to harmonize the three
different precursor bills. Instead, Congress simply eliminated some
(but by no means all) of the most obvious duplications and
inconsistencies and inserted all three bills into the final legislation,
giving each its own title. 132

A parallel exists between the haste in which SOx was enacted and
the haste in which the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 and the Airline Assistant Program ("the Funds") were enacted. 133
For example, Congress enacted the Funds within one week of the
September 11th attacks, an even quicker enactment than that of SOx. 134
Although the Funds are Congress' honest attempt to rectify some of the
126. See Shirley, supra note 75, at 501; see also Karmel, supra note 81, at 862.
127. Shirley, supra note 75, at 501.
128. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 80; see also Shirley, supra note 75, at
501-02.
129. Harvey L. Pitt and Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead At the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 165 ( 1990).
130. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour encourager /es autres? The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 376 (2004).
131. See Shirley, supra note 75, at 501; see also Karmel, supra note 81, at 862.
132. Bowman, supra note 130, at 403.
133. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 237 (2001) (codified as 49 U.S.C. 40101); see also, Raymond L. Mariani, Industry
in Crisis: A Progress Report on Victim Compensation and the Airlines After the September
11th Legislation, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 253, 253 (2003).
134. Mariani, supra note 133, at 253.
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financial damage caused by the attacks, they are a significant source of
discourse. 135 Many commentators believe the Funds, like SOx, are
more of a burden than a benefit, as they do not appreciate and identify
the true needs of the victims, nor offer adequate means of redress. 136
Instead of providing a solution, the Funds and SOx, simply provided
fertile ground for contentious litigation. 137

E.
1.

The Burdens of SOx on Foreign Issuers and Globalization

Difficulty in Compliance

Compliance with SOx is often quite difficult for foreign issuers.
For example, under SOx, disclosure requirements become more
rigorous. 13 Also, the SEC no longer permits foreign issuers to use IAS
in lieu of GAAP. 139 Furthermore, foreign auditing firms, who audit
foreign and U.S. issuers, must register with SOx's newly created
PCAOB. 140 This regulation, in particular, is hard for foreign auditing
firms to swallow because:
[SOx] makes it illegal for a foreign accounting firm to participate in
the preparation and issuance of audit report of an issuer without
having been registered with the PCAOB. Not only does this impose
restriction on activities of foreign accounting firms but also cause
concern with respect to encroachment of PCAOB in their business
.
141
practices ....

2.

Increased Costs

Compliance with SOx' s numerous regulations and corporate
governance stipulations, which all issuers must meet regardless of
origin, is a considerable expense for public, global companies. 142 For
example, Business Objects, a French company, is the third largest
software company in Europe. 143 In 2004, it had sales of $926 million
135. Id. at 254.
136. Id.
137. See generally id.
138. Karmel, supra note 81, at 862.
139. Id.
140. Sabyasachi Ghoshray, Impact ofSarbanes-Oxley on Multiple Listed Corporations:
Conflicts in Comparative Corporate Laws and Possible Remedies, 10 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 447, 450-51 (2004).
141. Id. at 450.
142. Id. at 452; see also Shirley, supra note 75, at 511.
143. Richard Waters, A Technology Success A La Silicon Vallee: A French Software
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dollars, giving it a market capitalization of $2.4 billion dollars. 144
However, "the regulatory burden placed on companies by the recent
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has cost Business Objects 'multiple millions
of dollars. "' 145
The extensive financial costs of SOx are not limited to large,
international companies. Small and mid-size companies bear the hefty
costs of SOx, as well. 146 For example, the costs for such companies
grew "130 percent since 2001, and are expected to keep increasing in
the near future. Due to the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations and increases in
shareholder litigation, smaller companies will spend between [one]
million and [two] million for legal and accounting fees, insurance and
investor relations." 147 Clearly, money spent meeting SOx requirements
is less money spent on global investment.

3.

Conflicts with International Law

It is common knowledge that, at times, domestic laws will conflict
with foreign laws. SOx, however, goes beyond general conflicts and
creates a number of excessive conflicts with the domestic laws of
foreign issuers. For example, SOx requires all members of an issuer's
audit committee to sit on the issuer's board of directors. 148 This
requirement is in direct conflict with "Section 85.6 of the Russian law
governing joint stock companies ... which prohibits members of the
audit committee from serving on the board of directors." 149 Another
direct conflict arises between SOx and German law. 150 "Section 301 of
[SOx] stipulates that a company's Audit Committee be directly
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the
company's auditor. On the contrary, German law requires shareholders
to appoint the auditor at their annual general meeting." 151 In Japan, a
point of contention arises in the translation of SOx:

Company has Drawn Lessons from US Enterprise Culture to Achieve Impressive Results,
FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 9, 2005.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. John Sinnenberg, The Pros and Cons of Going Private: Going Private is Not a
Panacea for an Ailing Public Company, but There is No Question that the Downsides of
Being Public, Especially for a Small Company, May Be Bigger than Ever, FIN. EXECUTIVE,
Jan. 1, 2005, at 24.
147. Id.
148. Ghoshray, supra note 140, at 453.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 454.
151. Id.
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[SOx] often uses the term "officer" to refer to the management of the
company. In Japan, corporations are run by boards of directors that
These
are divided into complex hierarchies of committees.
committees, in tum, govern the corporation through collective
decision-making. Thus, those who would be considered officers in the
United States are really board members in Japan who operate through
a committee. 152

Section 203 of SOx states that a registered public accounting firm
may not lawfully provide auditing services to an issuer if the audit
partner of the accounting firm "performed audit services for that issuer
in each of the [five] pervious fiscal years of that issuer." 153 This SOx
requirement that issuers rotate their auditor every five years poses
significant difficulties for Chinese issuers. 154 In China, "there is
approximately one certified public accountant per 13,000 [Chinese]
persons." In the U.S., however, there is "one certified public accountant
per 1000 [sic] persons." This leaves Chinese issuers scrabbling for
certified public accountants. 155
In general, "[t]he imposition of [SOx] on foreign corporations has
promoted objections from all comers of the world even from countries
whose laws do not outwardly conflict with [SOx]." 156
F.

The Post-SOx Options for Foreign Issuers

The initial reaction to SOx from European and other commentators
was of frustration and anger. 157 SOx's stringent requirements leave
foreign issuers with limited options. SOx simply forces many foreign
issuers to comply with the corporate governance structure that Congress
lays out in SOx and the SEC enforces. 158 As a result, it is "feared that
the burdensome provisions of [SOx] will drive issuers away from U.S.
capital markets." 159 That fear is real, for SOx "appeared to cause a
sharp decline in the number of foreign listings" on U.S. exchanges. 160
Some of the decline in foreign listings is, however, attributable to the
global recession, which followed shortly after the enactment of SOx, as
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Shirley, supra note 75, at 513.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 80, § 203.
Shirley, supra note 75, at 514.
Id.
Id. at515.
Karmel, supra note 81, at 857.
Shirley, supra note 75, at 525.
Id. at 526-27.
Karmel, supra note 81, at 857.
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discussed previously. 161
Regardless of the degree of blame that one allocates to either the
recession or SOx, there is no question that SOx' s impact on foreign
issuers and globalization is negative and significant. This detrimental
impact, however, is not limited to just those two factors, but also
includes the factor of international securities regulation. 162 SOx
unquestionably creates a rift in the relationship between the SEC and
foreign regulators:
[T]he unilateralism of Sarbanes-Oxley has created a political obstacle
to joint efforts by foreign regulators and the SEC in adopting a
common approach to corporate governance problems. Although the
EU has some reform ongoing with respect to corporate governance,
Sarbanes-Oxlev has engendered hostility toward the SEC in Europe
and elsewhere.163

IV. THEREGULATORS

A.

A Need for Regulation Harmony

The current degree of globalization, as discussed previously,
highlights a need to unify and harmonize the legal standards that will
govern cross-border trading. 164 A couple of issues fuel the current
movement towards unifying international standards, as opposed to
following individual, domestic standards. First, proponents of unifying
and harmonizing such standards advise that "[c]ountries around the
world compete for capital and in order to attract foreign capital they
tend to offer lax rules in the relevant areas of the law, including tax,
torts, environmental protection, and financial market regulation." 165 In
other words, it is a "race to the bottom theory," which suggests that both
those offering and those seeking investment capitals will migrate toward
jurisdictions with the lowest standard of regulation. 166
Second, "[a]n important justification for harmonization is the
interface of different jurisdictions in cases that involve more than one

161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM . J. COMP. L. 97, 100 (2002).
165. Id. at 104.
166. Id. at 106.
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jurisdiction and the difficulty in reconciling different legal regimes." 167
In other words, in addition to the general complexity in understanding
cases involving financial transactions, courts now face issues regarding
proper jurisdiction and applicable law because such transactions occur
between international parties. 168 Many times "conflicts among national
regulatory regimes may encourage regulatory arbitrage as well as ill
will among and between nations." 169 Therefore, in order to sustain an
ever-growing global securities market, the securities industry needs to
develop and harmonize universal legal standards. 170
This is not to say that establishing harmony will be an easy task.
"World stock markets differ considerably in terms of investors' access
to information, the market's financial stability, and other important
characteristics that determine market efficiency." 171 In the attempt to
create an ideal set of legal norms, framers cannot forget the key
components of a vibrant market, such as a company's need to be
dynamic and agile in order to compete. 172
In addition, harmonization is a costly endeavor, in both time and
money. 173
Yet, the benefits are potentially expediential, for
"standardization will accelerate the process of legal convergence with
the double benefit of reducing transaction costs for transnational
investors and increasing the quality of legal institutions in countries
whose institutions are less developed." 174
Thus, the issue arises, who should set the standard? Currently, the
number of governments, committees, action groups, associations, etc.,
involved in the regulation or governance of international securities
trading is staggering, with each offering their own input on the various
For
concerns associated with such regulation or governance. 175
example:

167. Id. at 105.
168. Testy, supra note 1, at 928-29.
169. Id. at 929.
170. See Pistor, supra note 164, at 100.
171. Matthew F. Gorra, On-Line Trading and United States Securities Policy:
Evaluating the SEC's Role in International Securities Regulation, 32 CORNELL INT'L L. J.
209, 219 (1998). "One striking difference between U.S. securities regulation and other
countries' regulation is that in some countries, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland,
banks, rather than national governments, are the primary securities market regulators. The
regulation in these countries is, therefore, vastly different than the U.S. governmentally-led
regulatory regime." Id.
172. Pistor, supra note 164, at 99.
173. See id. at 103.
174. Id. at 97.
175. Id. at 101.
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Some are professional interest groups whose members come primarily
from the private sector. An example is the International Federation of
Accountants (IF AC). Others recruit their members from national
regulatory agencies. Both the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) represent this category of international
standards setters. In addition, several multilateral organizations are
involved in building the legal architecture for global markets. The
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) has a long record of developing model laws and
international conventions and has recently adopted a Model Law on
cross-border insolvency. UNCITRAL collaborates with the World
Bank and the International Bar Association (IBA) in developing a
model law for domestic bankruptcy law. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recently
adopted standards for corporate governance, the so-called "Principles
of Corporate Governance." In addition, the OECD has developed a
separate set of corporate governance principles for transition
economies. Finally, the World Bank is also engaged in improving the
framework for corporate governance in many of its lending
countries. 176

Clearly, "[t]o create an effective system of regulation will mean
overcoming turf-wars." 177
Regardless of all the regulatory parties involved, their efforts to set
universal standards results only in non-binding recommendations
because they do not have regulatory authority .178 "Rather than
harmonizing highly-specified rules, the standards aim only at
establishing the principles for such rules." 179 In addition, there is a lack
of leadershi~ and central authority among the group, which is
worrisome. 18
"There are simply too many trade associations and
working parties, dissipating the force of their message and ...
needlessly duplicating effort." 181 Furthermore, "[t]hese groupings are
further discredited by the fact that the same faces from the same firms
almost inevitably appear on the roster of every new organization, and

176. Id. at 101.
177. Alex Brummer, Saturday Notebook: Regu1ators Must Talk to Each Other, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 12, 1995, at 34.
178. Pistor, supra note 164, at 101.
179. Id. at 102.
180. Richard Greensted, Committee Fails to Show Leadership, FIN. NEWS, Sept. 11,
2000.
181. Id.
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yet still fail to provide true leadership." 182
The issue thus remains, who should fulfill the international
leadership position and set global securities standards?

B.

TheSEC

One candidate for the lead role in establishing standardized
international securities regulation is the SEC. The SEC is a logical
choice given that its primary function is securities regulation and market
efficiency:
The SEC grew out of the stock market crash of 1929, as people felt
that speculation and fraud in the stock market led to the Great
Depression. Originally instituted as part of the New Deal in the
1930s, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the exchange of
securities. The Act's major provisions cover the initial securities
registration, the filing of periodic financial reports, the registration of
broker-dealers, and general disclosure and anti-fraud provisions. The
regulation of securities exchange was based on the notion that the
government should promote efficient stock markets. An efficient
stock market is deemed to be essential to the efficient allocation of
capital and other resources. SEC regulation of securities markets thus
grew out of a fear of economic collapse and showed a concern for the
most efficient allocation of resources in the market. . . . Hence the
SEC spends significant resources to reduce fraud or deception in
securities transactions. From the outset, one of the SEC's major
devices for protecting the efficiency of markets was to prevent fraud
and price manipulation .... 183

Overall, the SEC is dedicated to protecting U.S. investors and U.S.
markets, which are both significant, as discussed earlier. It does so by
"preserving market-wide transparency, fairness, and integrity." 184 As a
result, the SEC expanded tremendously, and it is no longer contained
within U.S. borders. 185 "[T]he internationalization of securities markets
has encouraged the SEC to regard itself as an international policing
agency . . . it would appear that internationalizing its efforts is now a
major SEC priority. Indeed, the SEC now employs a whole division

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Gorra, supra note 171, at 218-19.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 224-25.
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devoted to this subject." 186
Despite the SEC' s efforts and reputation, it is not the proper
organization for the task of harmonizing international securities
regulation, for many reasons.
For example, under the Third
Restatement of the United States' Foreign Relations Law, the SEC's
jurisdiction should be limited to within U.S. borders. The Third
Restatement advises that "one country's law can only compel a person
in another country to perform an Act 'to the extent permitted by the law
of his home jurisdiction."' 187 Although section 416 of the Third
Restatement provides the U.S.'s securities law with a long jurisdictional
reach, 188 it acknowledges jurisdiction over "conduct occurring
predominately in the [U.S.] that is related to a transaction in securities,
even if the transaction takes place outside the [U.S.]." 189 This "broad
reach ... has been the subject of significant criticism at home and
abroad, including being denounced as a form of legal and economic
imperialism." 190 The fear of being brought under U.S. jurisdiction and
subjected to SEC regulation leaves many foreign-broker dealers
unwilling to do business with U.S. investors. 191
C.

The !OSCO

A second qualified candidate for the leadership position in creating
international standards for securities regulation is the IOSCO. The birth
of the IOSCO dates back to 1947, when "nations of the Western
Hemisphere ... organized the Inter-American Association of Securities
Commissions to provide a forum for consideration of securities
regulation matters of common interest and to assist capital formulation
in the Western Hemisphere." 192 Despite its western origins and
headquarters in Canada, the IOSCO transformed itself into a worldwide, international regulator. 193
Although the organization adjusted its focus over the years, its
members 194 are still committed to their purpose, stated in the
186. Id. at 225 .
187. Ghoshray, supra note 140, at 451.
188. Testy, supra note 1, at 936.
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
416(1 )(d) (1987).
190. Testy, supra note 1, at 932-33 .
191. Gorra,supranote 171,at214.
192. A.A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 15 ( 1996).
193. Id. at 15-16.
194. "IOSCO has three classes of membership: regular, affiliate, and associate.
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organizations' bylaws: 195
[ 1] to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in
order to maintain just, efficient and sound markets; [2] to exchange
information on their respective experiences in order to promote the
development of domestic markets; [3] to unite their efforts to establish
standards and an effective surveillance of international securities
transactions; [and 4] to provide mutual assistance to promote the
integrity of the markets by a rigorous application of the standards and
by effective enforcement against offenses. 196

The IOSCO, however, does not always agree with other securities
regulators, such as the SEC, and occasionally fails to reach agreements
on critical issues. For example, in 1992 "[t]he gap between the [SEC]
and most other regulators appear[ ed] wider than ever, following the
failure of the [IOSCO's] technical committee to reach an agreement" on
international capital requirements for securities firms. 197
Regardless of periodic struggles, the IOSCO is successful in
setting international securities regulation standards. For example, in the
midst of the aforementioned 1992 dispute, the SEC chairman
acknowledged that the IOSCO "had made considerable progress on
standards for the much larger market in debt securities." 198 In 2003, the
SEC again praised the IOSCO, this time for its Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and the
Exchange of Information ("IOSCO MOU"). The SEC held that "[t]he
IOSCO MOU, which is the first global information-sharing arrangement
among securities regulators; [sic] sets a new international benchmark
for cooperation critical to combating violations of securities and
derivatives laws." 199
The SEC is not the only group or individual following the IOSCO.
Regular members are either government regulators of securities markets, or a self-regulatory
agency, such as a stock exchange, when there is no government regulator . ... Associate
members are associations of public regulatory bodies having jurisdiction in the subdivisions
of a country when the national regulator is a member. ... [A]ffiliate members are
international organizations with a universal or regional scope ... ."Id. at 17.
195. Id. at 16.
196. OICV-IOSCO, General Information on IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last
visited Dec. 30, 2005).
197. Tracy Corrigan, SEC and Regulators Deadlocked Over Capital Requirements,
FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 30, 1992.
198. Id.
199. Vanguard (Nigeria), International Organization of Securities Commission Warns
On Illegal Dealings in Capital Market, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS, Oct. 27, 2003.
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At the IOSCO's annual conference, "large numbers of persons in the
securities industry, lawyers, and others interested in international
financial matters attend as 'observers.'"200 This "following" suggests
that the IOSCO is a regulatory body that commands the attention of
groups and individuals who hold an interest in the international
securities industry.
V.

THE IOSCO: BEST SUITED FOR LEAD INTERNATIONAL REGULATOR

The IOSCO is better suited than the SEC as lead international
securities regulator for three specific reasons: its global commitment, its
independence, and its reputation. First, the IOSCO is not committed to
one specific market. 201 The IOSCO's focus is specifically international
securities trading and the global market. 202 In contrast, the SEC is
mostly committed to, focused on, and interested in, one place, the
U.S. 203 Despite maintaining divisions which focus on international
trading, the SEC is committed to protecting U.S. investors and U.S.
markets, not global investors and global markets. 204
Second, the IOSCO lacks self-interest because it holds no
allegiance to one specific country or market. 205 As a result, the IOSCO
can exercise independence in making decisions in the best interest of the
global market. The IOSCO's regulations have "the single goal of
facilitating cross-border access to capital by issuers."206 The SEC,
however, is a U.S. federal agency; thus, it is dependent upon and at the
mercy of the U.S. Congress. 207 It conducts itself in the best interest of
U.S. markets, not global markets. 208
Finally, the IOSCO, through achievements like its IOSCO MOU,
is an attractive and respected option for countries looking to partake in a
global market. 209 For example, as of October 2003, twenty-four
200. Sommer, supra note 192, at 21-22.
201. See generally Sommer, supra note 192.
202. See generally id.
203. See generally Gorra, supra note 171.
204. See generally id.; see also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The
Investors Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market Integrity,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter SEC
Protects].
205. See generally Sommer, supra note 192.
206. See id.
207. See generally Gorra, supra note 171; see also U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission,
The
Laws
That
Govern
the
Securities
Industry,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
208. See generally Gorra, supra note 171; see also SEC Protects, supra note 204.
209. Vanguard, supra note 199.
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countries had already signed onto the IOSCO MOU, with the
acknowledgment that it "truly reflects an international census[]. ... " 210
Furthermore, the IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation is "recognized today by the world financial community as
international benchmarks for all markets." 211 Whereas, the SEC is
currently in an unpopular position, from an international perspective,
because of its unilateralist approach under SOx and its deference to
Congress, as discussed earlier.
For these reasons, the IOSCO would best serve as the lead
governing body for international securities regulation.
CONCLUSION

Globalization through blossoming financial markets, more
specifically international securities trading, brings about a global
assimilation of capital markets. Although this development holds
benefits, such as increased efficiency in capital allocation and economic
stimulation, there are also drawbacks, such as a domino effect whenever
an economic disruption, in almost any form, occurs somewhere in the
global economy. In order to avoid or survive such a disruption and to
better secure investors, comity and cooperation are a must among
financial regulators and their laws. Domestic, self-interested laws and
regulators, such as the U.S.'s SOx and SEC, are unsuited for and
detrimental to globalization, regardless of the U.S's central position
within the international securities trading market. Rather, to establish
and sustain comity and cooperation, a committed, independent, and
favorable governing body, such as IOSCO, should take a leadership
position, set uniform, international standards, and be afforded the
authority and respect to govern international securities markets.

210. Id.
211. OICV-IOSCO,
IOSCO
Historical
Background,
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
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